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Leslie Salt v. United States: Section
404 Jurisdiction Over Artificial
Wetlands
SYLVIA COSBY* AND CHRISTOPHER PAUL**
INTRODUCTION
The question of who controls the nation's wetlands has
resulted in a battle between commercial developers and conser-
vationists over the disposition of a highly valuable, yet dimin-
ishing natural resource.' Armed with complex statutory
language, a detailed legislative history, and congressional del-
egation of regulatory authority, the U.S. Army Corps of En-
gineers ("Corps") is charged with keeping our nation's waters
under "lock and key." ' 2 On the other hand, commercial devel-
opers and landowners have pressures of their own, and perhaps
an equally provocative agenda-one which contemplates eco-
nomic viability and growth. Recently, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit negated an apparent victory for
commercial developers by reversing a lower court decision which
* Senior staff member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW; J.D., University of Kentucky, Class of 1993; B.B.A., Eastern Kentucky Uni-
versity, 1985.
** Senior staff member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW; J.D., University of Kentucky, Class of 1993; B.S., University of Wisconsin at
Madison, 1983.
See generally James T.B. Tripp & Michael Herz, Wetland Preservation and
Restoration: Changing Federal Priorities, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 221, 221-222
(1988). The article states that:
Well over half of the wetlands that existed in the continental United
States two centuries ago have been destroyed. When European settlers
first came to North America, the continental United States contained
approximately 215 million acres of wetlands. By 1987, this wetland acre-
age, disappearing at a rate of roughly 400,000 acres each year, has been
reduced to about 95 million acres. Because of the value of these wetlands
for water quality, fish and wildlife habitat, storage of flood waters,
groundwater recharge, and protection of endangered plant and animal
species, the United States can afford to lose no more.
I See infra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
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significantly limited the scope of the Corps' jurisdiction over
artificial wetlands under the Clean Water Act. In Leslie Salt
Co. v. U.S.,' the Ninth Circuit extended the Corps' regulatory
authority to adjacent wetlands that the federal and state gov-
ernments shared responsibility in creating. The appellate court
further held that the Corps had jurisdiction over artificially
created, nonadjacent wetlands that exhibit seasonal ponding
characteristics. Lastly, the court extended the Corps' authority
under the Clean Water Act to prevent dredge and fill activities
in nonadjacent waters to the extent that such waters provide
or may provide a habitat for migratory birds and endangered
species. The expanding scope of the Corps' jurisdiction over
wetlands regulation is evidenced by this Ninth Circuit decision
and is likely to solidify the federal government's role in pro-
tecting the nation's wetlands, even if the area in dispute is not
traditionally characterized as "wetlands."
I. THE CLEAN WATER ACT
In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act ("FWPCA"), the predecessor to the Clean Water Act.
4
The FWPCA's express purpose was to "restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters." 5 Pursuant to the Clean Water Act, Congress declared
that its national goal was to assure swimmable and fishable
waters by 1983 and to ensure "that the discharge of pollutants
into the navigable waters [was] eliminated by 1985."6 Congress
sought to achieve this goal by prohibiting the discharge of any
dredged7 or fill' materials into "navigable waters" of the United
States unless such activity was authorized by a permit issued
896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1089 [hereinafter Leslie
Salt]; see infra notes 69-146 and accompanying text.
I Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972)
(codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1373 (1982), amended by Clean Water Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1567, Dec. 27, 1977) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.A. §§
1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1987)) [hereinafter Clean Water Act].
33 U.S.C. §1251(a) (1982).
33 U.S.C. §1251(a)(1),(2) (1982). The Clean Water Act defines fill ("dredged
spoil") as a pollutant at 33 U.S.C. §1362(6).
1 33 C.F.R. §323.2(c),(d) (1987), defines "dredged material" and the "discharge
of dredged material".




by the Corps pursuant to section 404 of the Clean Water Act. 9
The Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief En-
gineers of the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"), shares
responsibility for permit issuance and enforcement with the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), which administers a similar permit program under
section 402 of the Clean Water Act.' 0 Moreover, the Clean
Water Act requires that regulations governing permit issuance
be jointly written by the Corps and the EPA." The regulations
identify factors for determining whether the proposed filling
activity for which the permit is sought will adversely impact
water quality. 12
The term "navigable waters" under the Act does not ex-
pressly include "wetlands." However, the Act does define nav-
igable waters as "waters of the United States .... ." Thus,
Congress granted the Corps authority to regulate "waters of
the United States,' '4 but with little express guidance as to
9 §404(a) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1344(a).
M 33 U.S.C. §§1342, 1344. §404(a) states that the "Secretary [of the Army] may
issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of
dredged or fill material into navigable waters at specified disposal sites."
" 33 U.S.C. §1344(a) (requires the Corps to evaluate a proposed filling for
consistency with EPA guidelines, after notice has been issued and public hearings have
been held); 40 C.F.R. §230 (1990).
11 Dredged or fill material should not be discharged into the aquatic ecosystem,
unless it can be demonstrated that such a discharge will not have an unacceptable
adverse impact either individually or in combination with known and/or probable
impacts of other activities affecting the ecosystems of concern. 40 C.F.R. §230.1(c)
(1990).
" 33 U.S.C. §1362(7) (1982).
14 The Corps' regulations define "waters of the United States" at 33 C.F.R.
§328.3(a). Included are:
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past,
or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including
all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as . . .wetlands . . .the use, degradation
or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce
including any such waters:
(iii) Which are used or could be used . . . in interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the
United States under the definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(l) - (4) of this
section;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are them-
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exactly which waters Congress intended to fall under its rubric
of "waters" to be protected. What is evident, however, is that
Congress did not intend its coverage under the Clean Water
Act to be limited to traditional notions of waters that were, in
fact, navigable. 5 It is also clear, given the stated purpose of
the Clean Water Act and its lengthy, detailed legislative history,
that Congress intended to drastically broaden the Corps' au-
thority beyond waters that were merely navigable in the tradi-
tional sense.' 6
While the EPA, using essentially the same language as that
of the Corps, was quick to latch on to the broader definition
of "waters" implied under the Clean Water Act, 7 the Corps
initially remained faithful to the traditional'construction of the
term "navigable waters." Thus, permits were required under
section 404 only if the dredge or fill activities took place on
waters that were literally (i.e., in fact) navigable. 8 In light of
this geographically limited interpretation, it became apparent
that activities placed outside of navigable waters, but which
affected their course, condition or capacity, were beyond the
reach of the Corps' jurisdiction.19
It was 1975 before the Corps acquiesced to pressures from
several governmental entities (including the Justice Department,
the EPA, and federal courts) and amended its regulations to
embrace the full legislative mandate it was given under the
Clean Water Act. 20 Consequently, the Corps issued interim final
selves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(l) - (6) of this section.
(emphasis added).
1 See S. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1972) (the Conference Report
indicated that "navigable waters" were to be given the broadest possible interpretation,
unencumbered by prior or future agency determinations).
,6 S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1971) (expressly stated that the
Clean Water Act extended the definition of navigable waters because "[wlater moves
in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the
source").
" See the definition of "navigable waters" promulgated by the EPA in U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY GENERAL COUNSEL OPINION (Feb. 6, 1973).
11 See generally Blumm, The Clean Water Act's Section 404 Permit Program
Enters Its Adolescence: An Institutional and Programmatic Perspective, 8 ECOLOGY
L. Q. 409 (1980).
"1 The extent of the Corp's geographical limits remained the ordinary high water
mark for fresh waters and the mean high water mark for tidal waters. See United
States v. Sexton Cove Estates, 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976).
See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp.
685 (D.D.C. 1975) (court ordered the Corps to expand the section 404 permit program
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regulations in which it expanded its definition of "navigable
waters" to include "fresh water wetlands" that were adjacent
to other waters within the Corps' jurisdiction.2" The Corps final
regulations, promulgated in 1977, broadened this "navigable
waters" definition by referring to "wetlands, ' 22 rather than
"freshwater wetlands." The effect of the 1977 regulations not
only provided the first mode of linking so-called "wetlands"
regulation to the provisions of the Clean Water Act, but it also
tacitly expanded the Corps' jurisdiction under section 404.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE CORPS' WETLAND
JURISDICTION
A. U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes
The leading United States Supreme Court case on federal
wetlands jurisdiction and the Corps' authority under the Clean
Water Act is U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes.23 In Riverside,
the Corps brought an action to enjoin the respondent from
filling its property near the shores of Lake St. Clair, Michigan,
without obtaining a permit. 24 The Corps characterized the prop-
erty as a "wetland" due to the presence of vegetation requiring
saturated soil conditions for growth. 25 The Corps also deter-
to include tributaries and wetlands adjacent to navigable waters, although such waters
were non-navigable); see also, United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp 665 (M.D. Fla.
1974) (concluding that the 1972 amendments extended the Corps' federal jurisdiction
to all waters that might affect interstate commerce, notwithstanding former "tradi-
tional" navigability tests).
21 See Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Alexander, 511 F. Supp 278, 289
(W.D. La. 1981) (quoting 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320); aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 715
F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983); later proceeding, 786 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1986).
33 C.F.R. §328.3(b) (1987) (formerly codified at 33 C.F.R. §323.2(c)). Wet-
lands are defined as:
[Tihose areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground
water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and under
normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically
adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include
swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas.
Note that the EPA uses identical language in its definition of "wetlands." See 40
C.F.R. §230.3(t) (1987).
2 474 U.S. 121, 106 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed.2d 419 (1985) (respondent's property
considered wetlands and thus subject to Corps' permitting authority before fill mate-
rials could be deposited on the private property) [hereinafter Riverside].
2 Id. at 121.
25 Id.
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mined that the source of the soil condition was ground water,
and the wetland on Riverside's property was "adjacent" to a
navigable body of water.2 6
Although the district court held that the property met the
requisite wetland conditions, 27 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit reversed. 28 The appellate court apparently
concluded that Riverside's property was not within the Corps'
jurisdiction because its aquatic characteristics were not the re-
sult of frequent flooding from the adjacent, navigable waters.2 9
Thus, the Sixth Circuit sought "to exclude [Riverside's land]
from the category of adjacent wetlands [i.e., from the defini-
tion of "waters of the United States"] that were . . . subject
to flooding by adjacent navigable waters at a frequency suffi-
cient to support the growth of aquatic vegetation." 30
In reversing the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that "[o]n a purely linguistic level, it may appear unrea-
sonable to classify 'lands,' wet or otherwise, as 'waters.'
3''
But, the Court reasoned that such a distinction "does justice
neither to the problem faced by the Corps in defining the scope
of its authority under section 404(a) [of the Clean Water Act],
or to the realities of the problems of water pollution that the
Clean Water Act was intended to combat." 32 The Court deter-
mined, as a general matter, that an agency charged with the
enforcement of a statute may appropriately look to the legis-
lative history and underlying policies to determine the scope of
its grant of authority.33 Similarly, the Court limited its own
review of the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction to a "reasonable-
ness" standard "in light of the language, policies, and legisla-
tive history of the [Clean Water] Act.
' 3 4
26 Id.; 33 C.F.R. §328.3(c) defines the term "adjacent" to mean "bordering,
contiguous, or neighboring. Wetlands separated from other waters of the United States
by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are
'adjacent wetlands"'.
21 The district court held that the portion of Riverside's property lying below
575.5 feet above sea level was a wetland
under the Corps' jurisdiction (cited in Riverside, 729 F.2d 391, 395 (6th Cir. 1984)).
"' id.
Riverside, 474 U.S. at 125.
30 Id. The court of appeals adopted a narrow construction of the Clean Water
Act to avoid the constitutional issue of a taking of property without just compensation,
a violation of the Fifth Amendment's taking clause. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
1, Id. at 132.
32 Id.




"Congress chose to define the waters35 covered by the [Clean
Water] Act broadly," 3 6 the Court stated, adding that "the
evident breadth of congressional concern for protection of wa-
ter quality and aquatic ecosystems suggests that it is reasonable
for the Corps to interpret the terms 'waters' to encompass
wetlands adjacent to waters." ' 37 Approving of the Corps' "ho-
listic" functional approach to regulating wetlands under the
Clean Water Act,3" the Court concluded: "[Tlhe Corps' eco-
logical judgment about the relationship between waters and
their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis for a legal
judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters
under the [Clean Water] Act." 3 9 The Justices' unanimous de-
cision noted that "the scope of the Corps' asserted jurisdiction
over wetlands was specifically brought to Congress' attention,
and Congress rejected measures designed to curb the Corps'
jurisdiction in large part because of its concern that protection
of wetlands would be unduly hampered by a narrowed defini-
tion of "navigable waters."' The Court held that "the Corps
has acted reasonably in interpreting the [Clean Water] Act to
require permits for the discharge of fill material into wetlands
adjacent to the 'waters of the United States."'
4'
In addition to endorsing the Corp's analysis so long as it
did not conflict with the express intent of Congress, 42 the Riv-
erside decision inevitably expanded the geographical scope of
"waters of the United States" under the Clean Water Act from
" The Clean Water Act defines "navigable waters" as the waters of the United
States. 33 U.S.C. §1362(7). The Corps' definition of "waters of the United States" is
at 33 C.F.R. §328.3(a), supra note 14.
36 Riverside, 474 U.S. at 133, 106 S.Ct. at 462 (1985).
37 Id.
11 42 Fed. Reg. 37,128 (1977):
The regulation of activities that cause water pollution cannot rely
on . . . artificial lines . . . but must focus on all waters that together
form the entire aquatic system. Water moves in hydrologic cycles, and
the pollution of this part of the aquatic system ... will affect the water
quality of the other waters within that aquatic system.
[Tihe landward limit of Federal jurisdiction under section 404 [of
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1344] must include any adjacent wet-
lands that form the border of or are in reasonable proximity to other
waters of the United States, as these wetlands are part of this aquatic
system. (emphasis added).
39 Riverside, 474 U.S. at 134, 106 S.Ct. at 463 (1985).
- Id. at 137, 106 S.Ct. at 464 (1985).
" Id. at 139, 106 S.Ct. at 465 (1985).
, Id. at 131.
1992-931
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its traditional notion of waters navigable "in fact" to include
wetlands which may be ecologically intertwined with such wa-
ters. However, the Supreme Court expressly left unanswered
the question of the Corps' authority to regulate nonadjacent
or isolated wetlands.4 3 This question was revisited in Leslie Salt
Co. v. U.S., infra.44
B. Swanson v. United States
Following a year after Riverside, the Ninth Circuit held in
Swanson v. United States45 that the Corps' construction of a
dam on an Idaho lake created waters under the Corps' federal
jurisdiction. In essence, the Corps' regulatory reach increased
as the water level rose over and above the old high-water
mark.4 6 The appellate panel in Swanson affirmed the federal
district court's determination that "the newly created outer
perimeter waters of the Lake are navigable waters subject to
[federal] regulation.' '
47
Relying on Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson,48 a Supreme Court
case decided 65 years previous, the trial court in Swanson held
that the broad constitutional power of Congress to regulate
and control activities affecting navigable waters under the fed-
eral commerce clause4 9 eclipsed state common law property
rights.so In Philadelphia Co., the property owner of an Ohio
River island challenged the fixing of harbor lines by the U.S.
Government, claiming they encroached on his land as defined
by state law. The owner's proposed construction of a wharf to
reclaim land, then submerged as a result of a federal dam
downstream, was not allowed without federal approval. Finding
for the government, the Supreme Court reasoned:
43 Id. at 131, 106 S.Ct. at 461. The Court stated in footnote 8: "[W]e are not
called upon ... to regulate discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not
adjacent to bodies of open water .. .and we do not express any opinion on that
question."
" 700 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Cal. 1988), rev'd and remanded, 896 F.2d 354 (9th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, -U.S. - , IIl S.Ct. 1089, 1090, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194
(1991) (infra notes 65-146 and accompanying text).
41 789 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Swansonl.~' Id.
" Id. at 1371.
49 223 U.S. 605, 32 S.Ct. 340, 56 L.Ed. 570 (1912) (cited in Swanson, 789 F.2d
at 1371) [hereinafter Philadelphia Co.].
, U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 3.
" Swanson, 600 F. Supp. 802, 807 (D.Id. 1985) (cited in 789 F.2d at 1370).
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The alterations produced in the course of the years by
the action of the water do not restrict the exercise of Federal
control in the regulation of [interstate] commerce. Its bed
may vary and its banks may change, but the Federal power
remains paramount over the stream .... The public right of
navigation follows the stream . . .and the authority of Con-
gress goes with it." (Citation omitted).
"Federal regulatory power was determined to extend to the
artificially raised high-water mark even though the landowner
held title defined by state law as extending to the old, natural
high-water mark."
'5 2
C. United States v. Ciampitti
In United States v. Ciampitti,"1 the government brought an
action to enjoin the defendant developer from placing fill on
his land, which exhibited wetland characteristics. The defendant
argued that the Corps lacked jurisdiction because, inter alia:
(1) the site was not a "natural" wetland, and (2) the area
became subject to tidal flow due to a manmade breach in the
railroad embankment. 54 The district court categorically con-
cluded that so long as the property was a wetland when the
Corps extended its jurisdiction and when the fill activity began,
the history of the site or the manner in which it became a
wetland was irrelevant.
55
D. Track 12, Inc. v. District Engineers
Similarly, the plaintiff developer in Track 12, Inc. v. Dis-
trict Engineers56 admitted to the possible wetland-like charac-
11 Philadelphia Co., 223 U.S. 605, 634-35, 32 S.Ct. 340, 350 (1912) (quoted in
Swanson, 789 F.2d at 1371).
"1 Swanson, 789 F.2d at 1371 (construing Philadelphia Co., 223 U.S. at 638, 32
S.Ct. at 351).
11 583 F. Supp. 483 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 772 F.2d 893 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1014, 106 S.Ct. 1192, 89 L.Ed.2d 307 (1986) [hereinafter Ciampilti.
' Id. at 492.
" Id. at 494. The court did not find any cases on point under the Clean Water
Act; its conclusion was based on analogous cases decided under the Rivers and Harbors
Act (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); United States v.
DeFelice, 641 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 940, 102 S.Ct. 474,
70 L.Ed.2d 247 (1981); United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927, 95 S.Ct. 1124, 43 L.Ed.2d 397 (1975)).
56 618 F. Supp. 448 (D.Minn. 1985) [hereinafter Track 12].
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teristics on his property, but contended that the Corps lacked
jurisdiction because it was an "artificial" wetland. Thus, such
wetlands cannot support the required "prevalence of vegetation
under normal circumstances.""7 Conceding the logical appeal
of plaintiff's argument, the district court nevertheless declared
that such an argument was contrary to the Corps' legislative
and judicial authority.58 The trial court did caution, however,
that the Corps' jurisdiction over artificially created wetlands
could be thwarted if the Corps itself was the creator. 9
E. United States v. Akers
The Ninth Circuit considered the issue of jurisdiction over
"artificial" wetlands for the first time in United States v.
Akers ° Attempting to distinguish his situation from Ciampitti
and Tract 12, supra, the defendant landowner shifted the focus
of his argument by asserting that the Corps had jurisdiction
only over "wetlands created by man-made structures over which
the landowner had no control. '61 The landowner reasoned that
since his own irrigation activities created the wetlands, the
Corps lacked jurisdiction.6 2 The district court, finding no basis
for such a distinction, rejected the landowner's argument, con-
cluding that jurisdiction over artificial wetlands did not depend
upon "who controls the structures which provide their sup-
ply." 63 The trial court further emphasized that the Corps' ju-
risdiction under the Clean Water Act should be "construed
broadly to further the Act's goals for protecting water qual-
ity." ' "
27 Id. at 450.
Id. (citing Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483 (D.N.J. 1984), see supra notes 53-55
and accompanying text; United States v. Bradshaw, 541 F. Supp. 880, 883 (D.Md.
1981) (concluding that the historical condition of the land was irrelevant where the
area was a wetland at the time the Corps asserted jurisdiction); United States v.
Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 673 (M.D.Fla. 1974) (concluding that Congress intended
the Clean Water Act to extend to artificially created canals)).
11 Track 12, 618 F. Supp. at 450 (citing U.S. v. City of Fort Pierre, S.D., 747
F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1984) (see infra notes 90-96, 102-106, and accompanying text).
651 F. Supp. 320 (E.D.Cal. 1987) iheTeinafter Akers].
" Id. at 322.
" Id. Akers noted that the holdings in Ciampitti and Track 12, supra, involved
situations where the artificial wetlands were created as a result of acts by state and
local authorities.
11 Id. at 323. The court explained that "it would have been a simple thing for
Congress or the Corps to have written a limitation to the so-called 'naturally occurring'






When the Corps issued its 1975 interim final regulations on
wetlands under section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 6 their
efforts at defining the term "wetlands" did not lead to a perfect
result. Even the 1977 regulations reflected efforts made by the
Corps to clear up ambiguities, close loopholes, and ultimately
broaden the scope of its wetland jurisdiction." For example,
the 1975 regulations suggested that vegetation "requires" sat-
urated conditions, whereas the 1977 regulations used a less
stringent test - "vegetation typically adapted for life in satu-
rated soil conditions." 6 7 The 1977 regulations also replaced the
"periodic inundation" condition in the 1975 definition with
language requiring inundation or saturation "at a frequency
and duration sufficient to support" vegetation."
Even the most rigorous attempts to codify a provision with
the utmost level of precision can create room for any number
of reasonable, yet conflicting, interpretations. As a practical
matter, developers and landowners have made efforts to capi-
talize on such ambiguities. The federal courts, however, have
consistently construed the Clean Water Act and Corps regula-
tions in the Corps' favor, thereby attempting to embrace con-
gressional intent. An excellent example of such judicial
interpretation resulting in the Corps being granted broad wet-
lands' jurisdiction (by capitalizing on the wetlands' nexus with
the "long arm" of the federal commerce clause power) is the
case of Leslie Salt Co. v. United States9
B. The Disputed Property at Leslie Salt Co.
Leslie Salt Co., a San Francisco Bay property owner, chal-
lenged the Corps' jurisdiction over its former salt manufactur-
61 See 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (1975) and supra note 21. §404 of the Clean Water
Act is codified at 33 U.S.C. §1344.
- See 33 C.F.R. §328.3(b) (1987) and supra note 22.
61 See Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Alexander, 511 F.Supp. 278, 289
(W.D.La. 1981), and supra note 21.
" See 42 Fed. Reg. 37,128 (1977) and supra note 38.
61 700 F. Supp. 476 (N.D.Cal. 1988), rev'd and remanded, 896 F.2d 354 (9th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, __U.S. __, IIl S.Ct. 1089, 1090, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194
(1991) Ihereinafter Leslie Salt]; see supra note 44.
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ing acreage after the Corps issued a cease and desist order to
prevent Leslie Salt from placing fill on a portion of its prop-
erty.70 U.S. District Court Judge Legge rejected, inter alia, the
Corps' argument that it had jurisdiction under the Clean Water
Act to prevent Leslie Salt's fill activities on its own property. 7'
The Corps appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, and Judge Farris reversed, ruling that the "southern
portions of Leslie's property [met] both the statutory and reg-
ulatory requirements for the Corps to exert Clean Water Act
jurisdiction" over the property owner's unpermitted activities.
72
A concise description of the property was set out in the
Ninth Circuit's opinion:
The dispute revolves around a 153-acre tract of land
A road separates the property into two parcels, one of 143
acres ("parcel 143") and one of 10 acres ("parcel 10"). The
property abuts the San Francisco National Wildlife Refuge.
and lies approximately one-quarter mile from Newark Slough,
a tidal arm of the San Francisco Bay.
73
Parcel 143 contained pastureland and other land formerly
used as calcium chloride pits and crystallizers for salt manu-
facturing by Leslie Salt. This parcel was essentially dry - it
had never been inundated by tides and was drained of water.
74
Most of parcel 10 (and some of parcel 143) on Leslie Salt's
property exhibited wetland characteristics, according to the
Corps. Three culverts built by the California Department of
Transportation ("Caltrans") during nearby road construction
brought slough water to the edges of the disputed property.
75
Caltran's highway construction activities, in addition to the
breach of a levy and the destruction of a floodgate which had
drained water off the parcels, "foster[ed] natural, ecological
developments" including: (1) the above-mentioned tidewater
which reached the disputed property's edge; (2) migratory birds
which used the crystallizer/pit areas as seasonal habitats; and
(3) an endangered species of mouse which used the property
70 Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 356; see §404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§1344.
11 Leslie Salt, 700 F. Supp. at 489.
12 Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 360.
" Id. at 355.
14 Leslie Salt, 700 F. Supp. at 479.
"1 Id. at 480. Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 356.
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for its habitat. 76 When Leslie Salt plowed the property in the
mid-1980s to control a dust problem, it began to dig a feeder
ditch and siltation pond to drain the land. The Corps, asserting
its jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, issued a cease and
desist order in 1987 against the property owner to prevent any
further unpermitted activity."
The Corps asserted jurisdiction pursuant to two categories
of "waters" under its definition of "waters of the United
States." First, the Corps asserted that parcel 10, along with
the southernmost tip of parcel 143, were "adjacent wetlands"
under its authority. 71 Second, the Corps claimed that the old
crystallizers and calcium chloride pits were "other waters"
under its regulatory authority.7 9 In addition, the Corps claimed
that Leslie Salt was discharging a pollutant (fill)80 into waters
of the United States in violation of the Clean Water Act.81
C. The District Court's Ruling in Leslie Salt
The Corps originally claimed jurisdiction over the majority
of Leslie Salt's property (parcel 143 and parcel 10),s2 relying
on its primary authority under the Clean Water Act, in addition
to its own regulations." The trial court rejected the Corps'
jurisdictional assertions because: (1) the wetland conditions
were caused by the government itself; (2) the conditions which
led to the (arguable) wetlands were not "normal;"" 4 and (3)
' 896 F.2d at 356.
Id. §404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1344(a) provides: "The (Corps)
may issue permits ... for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable
waters at specified disposal sites."
"1 Leslie Salt, 896 F,2d at 356. See supra note 14 for the Corps' definition of
"waters of the United States."
Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 357.
" The Clean Water Act defines fill ("dredged spoil") as a pollutant. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(6).
'1 Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 356. §301(a) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§1311(a), provides: "Except as in compliance with this section and section .. . 1344
of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful."
12 Leslie Salt, 700 F. Supp. at 482.
" The Clean Water Act is codified at 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq. The Corps'
regulations are set out at 33 C.F.R. §§320-330.
1' 33 C.F.R. §328,3(b) defines "wetlands" as "those areas that are inundated
or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to
support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation
typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include
swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas."
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Leslie Salt's property was not adjacent"5 to "waters of the
United States.' '86
The district court premised its conclusion - that the Corps
lacked jurisdiction over the southern portions of parcel 143 and
parcel 10 - on the role the Corps played in flooding the
adjacent wildlife refuge, which resulted in run-off onto Leslie
Salt's land.8" Additional human intervention, mainly in the
form of Caltrans' construction near Leslie Salt's property -
in particular the placement of culverts which "hydrologically
connected the property to the Newark Slough" 88 - led the trial
court to deny
the Corps' jurisdictional claim over the disputed property, rea-
soning that the Corps "had in essence tried to expand its own
jurisdiction by creating some wetland conditions where none
existed before." 89 Relying on U.S. v. City of Fort. Pierre,
S.D.,90 where a dry slough bed began to exhibit wetland char-
acteristics as a result of the Corps' dredging activity on a river
nearby, the trial court in Leslie Salt ruled against the Corps'
assertion of section 404 jurisdiction under the Clean Water
Act, 9' holding that "[tlo decide otherwise would allow the
Corps to enlarge its jurisdiction beyond the scope originally
intended by Congress." 92
The district court admitted that the relevant wetland vege-
tation was present, but the circumstances in those areas were
not "normal" because the "ability to support the vegetation"
was caused primarily by the Corps. 93 Similarly, the court held
that the "adjacency" requirement was not met because the
flow of water through the culverts onto Leslie's property was
the result of Corps activities. 94 The district court reasoned that
95 33 C.F.R. §328.3(a)(7). 33 C.F.R. §328.3(c) defines "adjacent" to mean
"bordering, contiguous, or neighboring. Wetlands separated from other waters of the
United States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and
the like are 'adjacent wetlands."'
" Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 357. See supra note 14 for the Corps' definition of
"waters of the United States."
1" Leslie Salt, 700 F. Supp. at 484.
" Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 356.
Leslie Salt, 700 F. Supp. at 481.
90 747 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Ft. Pierre].
33 U.S.C. §1344.
Leslie Salt, 700 F. Supp. at 481; Ft. Pierre, 747 F.2d at 467, 580 F. Supp.
1036 (D. S.D. 1983).
9 Leslie Salt, 700 F. Supp. at 488.
6, Id. at 489.
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an exception to the general principle of "broad jurisdiction"
should apply in situations where the Corps itself was respon-
sible for creating the wetland conditions. 95 The trial court urged
that a contrary conclusion would allow the Corps to inadver-
tently expand its own jurisdiction to areas where wetlands
would not otherwise exist. The lower court cited Ft. Pierre as
stating the proposition that the Corps cannot assert jurisdiction
to the extent that it contributed to or created the wetland
conditions.96
Lastly, the district court narrowed the Corps' jurisdiction
over non-adjacent wetlands by construing its "wetlands" sub-
section to include only "natural" formations. 97 Alternatively,
the trial court determined that the crystallizers and calcium pits
resulted from the mere seasonal ponding of water on otherwise
dry land.98 Therefore, these wetlands did not qualify as "other
waters" under the Clean Water Act or the Corps' regulations."
D. The Circuit Court's Ruling in Leslie Salt
On appeal, the Corps reduced the area over which it as-
serted jurisdiction to include most of parcel 10 and only the
southernmost portion of parcel 143, claiming these tracts were
"adjacent waters" and therefore subject to Corps regulation
under the Clean Water Act.1° The Ninth Circuit agreed with
the Corps' revised jurisdictional claim and reversed the district
court's ruling. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the trial court's
conclusion, 10 1 noting that the Eighth Circuit had recently reaf-
I d. at 482-84.
Leslie Salt, 700 F. Supp. at 484 (citing Ff. Pierre, 747 F.2d at 467). In Ft.
Pierre, a slough, originally a side-channel of the Missouri River, had been transformed
into dry land by railroad and highway construction. The Corps, as a result of routine
river dredging, subsequently transformed the slough back into a wetland. The court
found that the wetland was "stagnant" and polluted" and "devoid of wildlife,
support[ing] no fish or fowl, and .. .not conductive to recreation or other significant
use by the public."
9, Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 359-360. The district court applied a statutory con-
struction principle called the "ejusdem generis rule," which states that "where general
words follow an enumeration of ... things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent .... "See
supra note 84 for the Corps' definition of "wetlands."
9' Leslie Salt, 700 F. Supp. at 485.
Id. at 486.
'9 Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 356.
lo, Id. at 357-358.
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firmed limiting Ft. Pierre, supra, to the specific facts in that
case. 02 Distinguishing Ft. Pierre in Leslie Salt, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that the Corps "was not directly and solely respon-
sible for flooding Leslie's land," and thus "did not itself create
the wetland conditions and thereby attempt to expand its own
jurisdiction.'"
0 3
The appellate court further distinguished Ft. Pierre as a
situation where the Corps was solely responsible for creating
wetland conditions on private property where none had existed
before.104 In Leslie's case, since the Corps acted in concert with
third parties in creating the wetland conditions, its activities
could not be said to have "directly" caused the conditions on
the property. 0 5 Notwithstanding the Corps' activities, the Ninth
Circuit held that the "normalcy" and "adjacency" require-
ments for wetlands were met.' °6 Similar to the attitude of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Riverside,10 7 the appellate court in Leslie
Salt did not find favor in the district court's attempt to limit
the Corps' regulatory authority. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's un-
derlying conclusion was consistent with Riverside, supra, in
that it reflected the same sensitivity toward sustaining aquatic
ecosystems regardless of their origin. ' s
10 U.S. v. Southern Investment Co., 876 F.2d 606, 612 (8th Cir. 1989) (channel's
high-water level following Corps' project extended to property on which fill had been
placed, and therefore was within Corps' jurisdiction). The court held:
We were careful to limit our holding [in Ft. Pierre] and stated that
.our holding does not challenge the Corps' jurisdiction with regard
to any artificially created wetlands-type environment. Rather, our holding
is limited to the situation in which the Corps, as an unintended byproduct
of ordinary river maintenance, inadvertently creates a wetland-type eco-
logical system on private property where no such system previously
existed." Ft. Pierre, 747 F.2d at 467.
101 Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 358. The Ninth Circuit specifically noted activities by
Caltrans (highway construction) and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (which was in
charge of the adjacent San Francisco National Wildlife Refuge).
t" Id. at 357-58.
101 But see, Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483 (D.N.J. 1985), supra note 53: "[F]ederal
jurisdiction is determined by whether the site is presently wetlands and not by how it
came to be wetlands." Id. at 494.
' Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 358-59. The court stated that the southern portions
of the property were adjacent to waters of the United States because the water in the
culvert, running from Leslie's property, was directly connected to the Newark Slough.
,0, 474 U.S. 121, 106 S.Ct. 455 (1985). See supra notes 23-43, and accompanying
text.
", Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 358. "The Corps' jurisdiction does not depend on
how the property at issue became a water of the United States. Congress intended to
regulate local aquatic ecosystems regardless of their origin."
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The appellate panel also found unnecessary the district
court's reliance on technical statutory construction principles
and concluded that there was clear evidence to support Con-
gress' intention to include artificial or man-made structures in
the Corps' definition of "other waters". Both the Clean Water
Act and the River and Harbors Act are generally instructive,
as both have consistently asserted that the Corps' jurisdiction
extends to man-made or artificial waters.' °9 The Corps also
reserved under its regulations significant latitude to make case-
by-case assessments of any particular body of water, which
necessarily includes artificially created waters." 0 The Ninth Cir-
cuit also declared that the "seasonal nature of ponding is no
obstacle to Corps jurisdiction.""' Intermittent streams and playa
lakes are examples of seasonal structures expressly listed as
"other waters." 12
The circuit court did not entirely foreclose the district court's
concerns about encouraging "self-expanding" jurisdiction. The
appellate court suggested that where the facts indicate an in-
tentional attempt by the Corps to expand its own jurisdiction,
a different conclusion may be reached." 3 But even if the courts
were to adopt such a rule, it would appear that the Corps could
still engage in such activities, create wetland conditions where
none existed before, assert its jurisdiction and still fall slightly
short of the intentional conduct hypothesized by the Ninth
Circuit in Leslie Salt. Given the courts' extreme deference to
the Corps in general (as illustrated by the above cases) when it
exercises its authority under the Clean Water Act, finding such
intentional conduct by the Corps may be rare indeed.
V. AFTER LESLIE SALT, IS THE CORPS' JURISDICTION SELF-
EXPANDING?
The unresolved question lurking here appears to be exactly
what the trial court in Leslie Salt, supra, sought to prevent the
"9 See 33 C.F.R. §§328.5, 329.8 (1987).
33 C.F.R. §328.3(a) (1987).
Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 360.
,,2 See, e.g., Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986); United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp.
1181, 1187 (D.Ariz. 1975).
13 Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 357, 358 ("While [encouraging the Corps to expand
its own jurisdiction] is a valid concern, the facts of this case do not present such a
problem.... Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the Corps did not ...
attempt to expand its own jurisdiction").
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Corps from doing - "expand[ing] its own jurisdiction." ' 4
Does Leslie Salt and its reliance on Swanson and Philadelphia
Co., supra, stand for the proposition that the Corps' jurisdic-
tion over adjacent wetlands is "self-expanding?" Does con-
gressional approval of a Corps project amount to sanctioning
all the consequences of that project? The lower court in Leslie
Salt answered "no" to both questions," 5 but implied in the
Ninth Circuit's decision is a qualified "yes."
A. Scope of "Adjacency"
The fluid concept of "adjacency""16 and the related issue
of what constitutes "adjacent wetlands'" 7 led the Ninth Circuit
in Leslie Salt to remand two issues to the district court for a
factual determination: (1) whether the crystallizers and pits in
parcel 143 have a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to
fall within the Corps' jurisdictional reach; and (2) how much
of parcel 143 is within the valid regulatory authority of the
Corps, "because the record reflects the Corps' jurisdiction does
not extend to the total property.""'  The appellate panel found
the adjacency requirement existed on the southern portions of
Leslie Salt's property (most of parcel 10 and some portions of
parcel 143) because the tracts were "adjacent to waters of the
United States - [essentially] the water in the culvert, which
[wa]s directly connected to the Newark Slough."" 9 Thus, since
"navigable waters" are defined as: (1) "waters of the United
States" under the Clean Water Act; 20 and (2) "those waters
. . . subject to the ebb and flow of the tide" under the Corps'
regulations,' 2 ' the tidewater reaching Leslie Salt's property 
2
made it an adjacent wetlands under the Corps' jurisdiction.
700 F. Supp. at 481.
Id.
The Corps" definition of "adjacent" is found at 33 C.F.R. §328.3(c); see
supra notes 26 and 85, and accompanying text.
- The Corps' definition of "wetlands is found at 33 C.F.R. §328.3(b); see supra
note 84. Examples of "adjacent wetlands" are found at 33 C.F.R. §328.3(c). In
addition, "waters of the United States," include "wetlands adjacent to waters (other
than waters that are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(l) - (6) of
§328.3(a). 33 C.F.R. §328.3(a)(7); see supra note 14.
l' Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 361.
Id. at 358-59.
33 U.S.C. §1362(7); see supra note 35.
33 C.F.R. §329.4.
"1 Leslie Salt, 700 F. Supp. at 481 ("Despite requests from Leslie, neither the
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B. "Other Waters," or Nonadjacent "Isolated" Wetlands
The trial court in Leslie Salt, supra, disagreed with the
Corps' determination that the former crystallizers and calcium
chloride pits (on parcel 143) qualified as "other waters'
123
which were subject to federal regulatory authority. 124 However,
the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court
for a factual determination of this second issue. 125 Dissenting,
Circuit Judge Rymer agreed with the district court that the
crystallizers and pits on parcel 143 were not "other waters"
within the Corps' jurisdiction. 26 Noting that the "cycle of
(seasonal] ponding ... create[d] no hydrological connection
with any other body of water," Judge Rymer stated: "IT]here
is nothing in the record to show that water flows directly or
indirectly from the crystallizers or pits into another body of
water.' 127
The most significant element of the Corps' "isolated wa-
ters" provision is its requisite link to interstate commerce. The
Corps' regulations imply a rather restrictive view of interstate
commerce under the Clean Water Act, namely a connection
only with interstate "travel" or "commerce". 2  In order to
establish the interstate connection in Leslie Salt, however, the
Corps relied on the EPA's criteria for determining a sufficient
- Leslie Salt, 700 F. Supp. at 481 ("Despite requests from Leslie, neither the
United States [Fish and Wildlife Service] nor Caltrans ha[d] installed effective tide
control mechanisms on the culverts or ditches, with the result that some water occa-
sionally reache[d] the edges of Leslie's property in the culverts and ditches.")
' Included in the Corps' definition of "waters of the United States" are "[a]ll
other waters such as . .. wetlands ... the use, degradation or destruction of which
could affect interstate . . . commerce including any such waters . . . (iii) [w]hich are
used or could be used ... in interstate commerce." 33 C.F.R. §328.3(a)(3). See supra
note 14.
142 Leslie Salt, 700 F. Supp. at 485-86.
"2 Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 361.
"- Id. at 361.
127 Id.
2 33 C.F.R. §328.3(a)(3) (1987):
All other waters . . . the use, degradation or destruction of which
could affect interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for
recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in
interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by
industries in interstate commerce .... (Emphasis added).
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nexus to interstate commerce. 12 9 The EPA considered the "use
or possible use" of the property as a habitat for migratory
birds and endangered species to be a sufficient connection, or
nexus, to interstate commerce.,3 0
In Leslie Salt, the trial court referred to the Corps' "other
waters" regulation as the "isolated" wetlands or waters pro-
vision."t3 The district court continued:
The general thrust of this subsection is that certain waters
or wetlands may be waters of the United States even though
they are physically unconnected with other waters of the
United States. The jurisdictional nexus for including such
isolated waters within federal jurisdiction .. . is some con-
nection with interstate travel or commerce.' 32
The trial court in Leslie Salt found that most of parcel 143 did
not meet the threshold requirements of being "other waters,"
and therefore never reached the required interstate commerce
nexus. 3 3 The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding the property in
question "other waters," and remanded to the district court
for a determination of the interstate commerce issue.
34
In his dissent, which favored the district court's approach,
Judge Rymer cited the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Riv-
erside,'35 where the Court stated: "We are not called upon to
address the question of the authority of the Corps to regulate
discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent
to bodies of open water.. . and we do not express any opinion
on that question."' 3 6 According to Judge Rymer:
[T]he issue in this case is . . . whether Congress meant to
extend [the] Corps' jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act
to the full extent of its commerce clause power. Specifically,
[the issue] is: is it reasonable for [the] Corps' jurisdiction to
rest on the fact that migratory birds and endangered species
may use the waters as a habitat?
3 7
129 Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 360.
110 Id. Migratory birds and an endangered species of mouse were found on Leslie
Salt's property. Leslie Salt, 700 F. Supp. at 485.
"1 700 F. Supp. at 484-85; 33 C.F.R. §328.3(a)(3); see supra note 123.
"1 Leslie Salt, 700 F. Supp. at 485.
I d. at 485-86.
, Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 359-61.
"' 474 U.S. 121, 106 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed.2d 419 (1985); see supra notes 23-43
and accompanying text.
1 Id. at 131, n.8, 106 S.Ct. at 461, n.8 (citation omitted).
131 Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 361 n.l.
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Because the district court at trial made such a finding,'
and the Corps' regulations provide that the presence of such
animal life may be a sufficient nexus, the appellate majority in
Leslie Salt determined that the "commerce clause power, and
thus the Clean Water Act, is broad enough to extend the Corps'
jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to mi-
gratory birds and endangered species."'
39
The property owners, Leslie Salt Co., argued at trial that
Congress did not intend migratory birds or endangered species
to be "interstate commerce" under the Clean Water Act, and
that even if this was congressional intent, such an extension of
the Corps' jurisdiction would not be constitutionally permissi-
ble.' 40 Judge Rymer's dissent pointed out that, although Con-
gress rejected efforts to limit the Corps' jurisdiction as to
wetlands under the Clean Water Act in 1977,141 this in no way
represented blanket congressional approval of the "reasonable-
ness" of the Corps' 1986 regulations, 42 which discuss "other
waters" and the interstate commerce nexus as to endangered
species or migratory birds. He continued:
Such evidence of reasonableness does not exist in this
case .... This 1986 addition to, or clarificaton of, the Corps'
regulations was not considered during congressional debates
on the Clean Water Act of 1977. Therefore, the evidence of
reasonableness that the Supreme Court found regarding the
Corps' regulations in Riverside Bayview Homes does not
apply to the 1986 clarification of those regulations, in partic-
ular, the list that includes migratory and endangered species
habitats. 43
"I Leslie Salt, 700 F.Supp. at 485 (migratory birds and endangered mouse found
on property).
"I Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 360. The Corps adopted EPA criteria to determine
when waters have sufficient ties to interstate commerce if migratory birds or endan-
gered species are found. See 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
" Leslie Salt, 700 F. Supp. at 485.
1' Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 361 n.1 (citing Riverside, 474 U.S. at 137, 106 S.Ct.
at 464 (1985) (Congressional rejection of efforts to restrict the Corps' asserted juris-
diction over adjacent wetlands regulation is evidence of the reasonableness of the
Corps' construction of the Clean Water Act)).
51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
, Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 361 n.1. The Corps issued new regulations governing
its regulatory programs, see supra note 142, in order to clarify the scope of its section
404 permit program under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1344.
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The Ninth Circuit disagreed. Relying on Utah v. Marsh,'"
the appellate court declared that the "long arm" of federal
commerce clause power and the Corps' authority under the
Clean Water Act were broad enough to encompass local waters
which might provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered
species.14 1 Utah v. Marsh differed from Leslie Salt in that it
provided protection to migratory birds visiting a local lake,
which otherwise had sufficient connections with interstate com-
merce.'4 Unlike the situation in Utah v. Marsh, the crystallizers
and pits on Leslie's land were neither recreational nor fishable
waters. By holding that the Clean Water Act may embrace the
regulation of migratory birds and endangered species, the Leslie
Salt decision effectively blurs any distinctions between "inter-
state commerce" under the Clean Water Act and Congress' full
commerce clause authority. It follows, then, that the Ninth
Circuit would agree that Congress meant to extend the Corps'
jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act to the full scope of its
federal commerce clause power.
CONCLUSION
The Corps continues to revise its regulations regarding its
jurisdictional reach over wetlands under authority of the Clean
Water Act.1 47 The 1989 Manual' 4s provides guidance to federal
agencies in determining what are "wetlands" within the Corps'
section 404 regulatory program, 4 9 and the proposed revisions
are intended to "minimize the potential for erroneous wetlands
determinations."' 50 Possibly taking a cue from federal case law
like Leslie Salt, supra, the Corps states in no uncertain terms
that "[tihe changes we are developing are not intended to
-- 740 F.2d 799, 804 (10th Cir. 1984) (Corps granted jurisdiction over a local
lake, which was used by interstate travelers for public recreation and supported a
commercial fishery with out-of-state markets; lake was a habitat to several species of
migratory birds protected under international treaties).
" Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 360.
See generally Jerry Jackson, Wetlands and the Commerce Clause: The Con-
stitutionality of Current Wetland Regulation Under Section 404 of the Clean Water
Act, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCEs L. 307 (1988).
'* 56 Fed. Reg. 40,446 (Aug. 14, 1991) (proposed revisions for the 1989 Federal
Manual for Identifying and Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands) [hereinafter 1989
Manual].
s Id.
14' Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1344.
11 56 Fed. Reg. at 40,447 (1991).
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reduce jurisdiction," but rather to "tighten the evidence re-
quirements . . . in . . . defin[ing] . . . wetlands."'' Such plain
language is one more indication of the expanding scope of the
Corps' jurisdiction over the nation's wetlands, and in particular
the atypical conditions in Leslie Salt that led to the Corps
asserting its broad regulatory authority over Leslie Salt's prop-
erty. The likely consequence of this is a continuing battle with
landowners and developers over just how far the Corps' juris-
diction will, in fact, reach.
151 Id.
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